


WEST Search History

DATE: Sunday, June 12, 2005

| <u>Hide?</u> | <u>Set Name</u> | <u>Query</u> | <u>Hit Count</u> |
|---|-----------------|--|------------------|
| <i>DB=PGPB,USPT,USOC,EPAB,JPAB,DWPI,TDBD; PLUR=YES; OP=OR</i> | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L30 | L28 and "prevent transmission" | 0 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L29 | L28 same "prevent transmission" | 0 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L28 | "flooding attack" same "time interval" | 14 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L27 | "flooding attack" near "predetermined time interval" | 0 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L26 | "flooding attack" and "predetermined time interval" | 3 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L25 | "flooding attack" same "predetermined time interval" | 0 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L24 | "flooding attack" with "predetermined time interval" | 0 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L23 | "flooding attack" with "predetermined timing interval" | 0 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L22 | L21 and "predetermined time interval" | 2 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L21 | L15 and "flooding attack" | 39 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L20 | L19 and L18 | 1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L19 | L16 and L17 | 1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L18 | at&t.asn. | 8622 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L17 | tewani.in. and kamlesh.in. | 16 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L16 | halasz.in. and sylvia.in. | 1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L15 | 713/201.ccls. | 3682 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L14 | 713/200.ccls. | 3060 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L13 | 709/229.ccls. | 2389 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L12 | 709/227.ccls. | 2564 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L11 | 709/224.ccls. | 3952 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L10 | 709/225.ccls. | 1815 |
| <i>DB=USPT; PLUR=YES; OP=OR</i> | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L9 | L2 and "first connection" | 1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L8 | L7 and (signal) | 1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L7 | L6 and (address) | 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L6 | L5 and (den\$5) | 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L5 | L4 and "time interval" | 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L4 | L2 and "connection" | 17 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L3 | L2 and "data connection" | 0 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L2 | "flooding attack" | 18 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | L1 | "flooding attack" same "host device" | 0 |



Web Results 1 - 10 of about 17,800 for **flooding attack, time interval, synchronization, signal, IP address**. (

Keeping Time on Windows Machines

It's important that the **time** on machines are closely **synchronized**, ... Note that Windows 2000 only recognizes the first DNS or **IP address** in the "ntp server ...
www.wilsonmar.com/1clocks.htm - 49k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

[PDF] Anomaly detection in IP networks - Signal Processing, IEEE ...

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - [View as HTML](#)

flooding attacks. SYN **flooding attacks** capitalize ... network measurements, IP QoS, **time series analysis**, and **signal detection theory**. ...

www.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/eecs589/papers/AnomalyDetection.pdf - [Similar pages](#)

Solaris - Tuning Your TCP/IP Stack

This value is interesting considering SYN **flood attacks** on your server. ...
Each **IP address** is assumed to be a logical interface. ...

www.sean.de/Solaris/soltune.html - 101k - Jun 11, 2005 - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

[PDF] Distinguishing between single and multi-source attacks using ...

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the complete **IP address** space. Many **attack** tools use reflection techniques, subnet spoofing, or do ... tight **time synchronization** between attacking hosts ...

www.isi.edu/~hussain/pubs/Hussain04b.pdf - [Similar pages](#)

[PDF] Distributed Denial of Service

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat

the specified **IP addresses** for a period of time (default is 120 seconds, or 1 - 1999 ... All of the **attacks** utilize spoofing of **IP addresses**. ...

www.ciac.org/ciac/documents/CIAC-2319_Distributed_Denial_of_Service.pdf - [Similar pages](#)

[PDF] COPING WITH OVERLOAD ON THE NETWORK TIME PROTOCOL PUBLIC SERVERS

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - [View as HTML](#)

Annual Precise **Time** and **Time Interval** (PTTI) Meeting. 12. destination **IP address** and use a load-sharing scheme similar to USNO and NIST to distribute ...

tycho.usno.navy.mil/ptti/ptti2004/paper2.pdf - Jun 11, 2005 - [Similar pages](#)

[DOC] DDoS Attacks

File Format: Microsoft Word 2000 - [View as HTML](#)

The following **attack** parameters are controllable: victims **IP addresses**, ...

The timeStamp is needed for calculations of **time intervals** between several ...

www-comnet.technion.ac.il/~cn1w03/docs/DDoS_MidSubmission2_final2.doc - [Similar pages](#)

[PDF] 15-441 Spring 2004 - Final Name: _____ Andrew ID ...

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - [View as HTML](#)

the host name corresponding to the destination **IP address** for the packet ...

a) A SYN **flood attack** with randomly spoofed source **addresses** against 23.45.6.7 ...

www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~srini/15-441/S05/exams/2004sp_final.pdf - [Similar pages](#)

[PDF] Perimeter-Based Defense against High Bandwidth DDoS Attacks

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - [View as HTML](#)

perimeter-based **IP** traceback, it can determine the **addresses** of the edge routers

... Under the **attack**, the victim **signals** router A to initiate the defense. ...

www.cise.ufl.edu/~sgchen/papers/TPDS2005.pdf - [Similar pages](#)

[PDF] [Collaborative Defense against Periodic Shrew DDoS Attacks in ...](#)

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - [View as HTML](#)

constant **time interval**, which in our case is 1 ms. ... Although the source IP


addresses are. generally spoofed in **attack** packets, it is safe to use the ...

gridsec.usc.edu/files/TR/ACMTISSEC-LowRateAttack-May3-05.pdf - [Similar pages](#)

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